

o indulge in the finer distinctions and the more subtle reservations permitted by tradition of 'both-and'.

Contradictory Levels Continued

2 *Double-Functioning Element*
e 'double functioning' element and 'both-and' are related, but there is a distinction: the double-functioning element pertains more to the particulars of use and structure, while both-and refers more to the relation of the part to the whole. Both-and emphasizes double meanings over double-functions.

Accommodation and the Limitations of Order

The Conventional Element
A valid order accommodates the circumstantial contradictions of a complex reality, it accommodates as well as imposes. It thereby admits 'control and spontaneity', correctness and ease' - improvisation within the whole. It tolerates qualifications and compromise. There are no fixed laws in architecture, but not everything will work in a building or a city.

The Inside and the Outside

Contrast between the inside and the outside can be a major manifestation of contradiction in architecture. However, one of the powerful twentieth century orthodoxies has been the necessity for continuity between them: the inside should be expressed on the outside.

The Obligation Toward the Difficult Whole

An architecture of complexity and accommodation does not forsake the whole. In fact, I have referred to a special obligation toward the whole because the whole is difficult to achieve. And I have emphasized the goal of unity rather than of simplification in an art 'whose . . . truth [is] in its totality.' It is the difficult unity through inclusion rather than the easy unity through exclusion.

Extracts. Source: Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, 2nd edition, The Museum of Modern Art in association with the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts (New York/Chicago), 1977. © The Museum of Modern Art, New York. A version of this text was first published in *Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal*, no 9/10, 1965. Reprinted by permission from *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*. © 1966 The Museum of Modern Art, New York.

1969 CHARLES JENCKS

Semiology and Architecture

Over the 1950s and 60s, the study of language and signs was increasingly applied to areas outside linguistics, most notably by writers such as Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco and A.J. Greimas. Charles Jencks (b. 1939) was one of the first writers in English to apply it to architecture (he studied *English Literature and Architecture at Harvard*). As part of a critique of Modernism, Jencks' use of semiology laid the foundation for the Post-Modernism of which he was a principal champion.

Meaning, Inevitable yet Denied

This is perhaps the most fundamental idea of semiology and meaning in architecture: the idea that any form in the environment, or sign in language, is motivated, or capable of being motivated. It helps to explain why all of a sudden forms come alive or fall into bits. For it contends that, although a form may be initially arbitrary or non-motivated as Saussure points out, its subsequent use is motivated or based on some determinants. Or we can take a slightly different point of view and say that the minute a new form is invented it will acquire, inevitably, a meaning. 'This semantization is inevitable; as soon as there is a society, every usage is converted into a sign of itself; the use of a raincoat is to give protection from the rain, but this cannot be dissociated from the very signs of an atmospheric situation'. Or, to be more exact, the use of a raincoat *can be* dissociated from its shared meanings if we avoid its social use or explicitly decide to deny it further meaning.

It is this conscious denial of connotations which has had an interesting history with the avant-garde. Annoyed either by the glib reduction of their work to its social meanings or the contamination of the strange by an old language, they have insisted on the intractability of the new and confusing. 'Our League of Nations symbolizes nothing' said the architect Hannes Meyer, all too weary of the creation of buildings around past metaphors. 'My poem means nothing; it just is. My painting is meaningless. Against Interpretation: The Literature of Silence. Entirely radical.' Most of these statements are objecting to the 'inevitable semantization' which is trite, which is coarse, which is too anthropomorphic and old. Some are simply nihilistic and based on the belief that any meaning which may be applied is spurious; it denies the fundamental absurdity of human existence. In any case, on one level, all these statements are paradoxical. In their denial of meaning, they create it. (pp 11-12)

CHARLES JENCKS AND NATHAN SILVER

Adhocism

An outgrowth of both the Pop architecture of the 1950s and 60s and Jencks' investigations of semiology, his adhocism exploits the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified, between form and function. It represents a further polemic against Modernist purism and élitism but, compared to the extremes of Pop, is at once less consumed by technology and more pluralist.

The Spirit of Adhocism

Ad hoc means 'for this' specific need or purpose.

A need is common to all living things; only men have higher purposes. But these needs and purposes are normally frustrated by the great time and energy expended in their realization.

A purpose immediately fulfilled is the ideal of adhocism; it cuts through the usual delays caused by specialization, bureaucracy and hierarchical organization.

Today we are immersed in forces and ideas that hinder the fulfilment of human purposes; large corporations standardize and limit our choice; philosophies of behaviorism condition people to deny their potential freedom; 'modern architecture' becomes the convention for 'good taste' and an excuse to deny the plurality of actual needs.

But a new mode of direct action is emerging, the rebirth of a democratic mode and style, where everyone can create his personal environment out of impersonal subsystems, whether they are new or old, modern or antique. By realizing his immediate needs, by combining *ad hoc* parts, the individual creates, sustains and transcends himself. Shaping the local environment towards desired ends is a key to mental health; the present environment, blank and unresponsive, is a key to idiocy and brainwashing . . . (p15)

The Pluralist Universe, or Pluriverse

The man-made world is built up of fragments from the past.

We live in a pluralist world confronted by competing philosophies, and knowledge is in an *ad hoc*, fragmented state prior to some possible synthesis . . . (p29)

The evolution of society toward the abolition of classes, the population explosion and technological development pose enormous problems of organization of the physical environment. In order to preserve its role, architecture must assume clear ideological positions and operative procedures with regard to these problems . . . (p211)

In reality, participation transforms architectural planning from the authoritarian to which it has been up to now into a process. A process which begins with the discovery of the user's needs, passes through the formulations of formal and organizational hypotheses, reaches a phase of use where, instead of coming to a close, the process is re-opened in a continuous interaction of controls and reformulations which feed back into the needs and hypotheses, soliciting their continual redefinition . . . (p212)

The growth and flexibility of an architectural organism are not really possible except through a new conception of architectural quality. And this new conception cannot be formulated except by means of a more attentive exploration of those phenomena of creative participation which are dismissed as 'disorder'. It is in their intricate context, in fact, that we will find the matrix of an open and self-generating formal organization which rejects a private and exclusive way of using land and, through this rejection, delineates a new way of using it on a pluralistic and inclusive basis. In giving the user a creative role, we implicitly accept this basis, and in this way the morphological and structural conceptions and all the operative tools which have so far governed architectural production become open to question. The whole vast set of variables which institutional culture and practice had suppressed come back into play, and the field of reality in which architecture intervenes becomes macroscopic and complex. Thus only the adoption of clear ideological positions and the application of rigorously scientific procedures can guarantee a legitimate political and technical framework within which new sets of objectives can give rise, through the use of new practical instruments, to a balanced and stimulating physical environment. (p215)

Extracts. Source: Reprinted from Benedict Zucchi, *Giancarlo De Carlo*, Butterworth Architecture, (Oxford) 1992. © Giancarlo De Carlo. Based on a text first prepared for a conference held in Liège in 1969, then published as an article in *Parametro* no 5, 1970, then in *Environnement*, no 3, March 1970, under the title, 'L'Architecture, est-elle trop importante pour être confiée aux architectes?' With permission from Elsevier.

1970

GIANCARLO DE CARLO Architecture's Public


A sometime member of Team 10, Giancarlo de Carlo (b 1919, Genoa) was an early advocate of participatory design. Reacting against the reductive and authoritarian nature of Modernism, he sought to initiate a broader design process that took account of a wider range of people and ideas. This paper, originally delivered at a conference in Liege in 1969, first had the deliberately provocative title, 'Architecture, too important to be left to the architects?'

In reality, architecture is too important by now to be left to the architects. A real change is necessary, therefore, which will encourage new characteristics in the practice of architecture and new behaviour patterns in its authors: therefore all barriers between builders and users must be abolished, so that building and using become two different parts of the same planning process; therefore the intrinsic aggressiveness of architecture and the forced passivity of the user must dissolve in a condition of creative and decisional equivalence where each – with a different specific impact – is the architect, and every architectural event – regardless of who conceives it and carries it out – is considered architecture. The change, in other words, must coincide with the subversion of the present condition, where to be an architect is the result of power delegated in a repressive fashion and to be architecture is the result of reference to class codes which legitimate only the exception, with an emphasis proportional to the degree to which it is cut off from its context. The expedient of 'not reading the surroundings' (used so well by official criticism by means of the technique of uninhabited cut-outs or even trick photographs; or by the use of a linguistic analysis which excludes all judgement on the use and consumption of the event under analysis) corresponds, in fact, to an ideological, political, social, and cultural falsification which has no counterpart in other disciplines . . . (p210)

We cannot sit waiting . . . (in the cave of architecture-as-it-is waiting for the social palingensis to generate automatically architecture-as-it-will-be) but we must immediately change the whole range of objects and subjects which participate in the architectural process at the present time. There is no other way, besides this one, to recover architecture's historical legitimacy, or, as we have said, its credibility . . .

technical school is shown by comparing it with my distaste for the formalists. The latter is shown on the negative side of all three poles, not because it does not make positive efforts, but because in my judgement it fails (this is a diagram of pre-judice). Lastly, Corbusier, Aalto and Archigram are far out on the positive side and thus explicitly show my preference. But this is not all. What is also indicates is that my experience of the latter inextricably links matrices which are normally dissociated.

Extracts. Source: *Meaning in Architecture*, Charles Jencks and George Baird eds, Barrie & Rockliff: The Crescent Press (London), 1969. © The Contributors and Design Yearbook Limited.



Sign Situation

first point on which most semiologists would agree is that one simply cannot speak of 'meaning' as if it were one thing that we can all know or share. The concept of meaning is multivalent, has many meanings itself; and we will have to be aware of which one we are discussing. Thus in their seminal book *The Meaning of Meaning*, Ogden and Richards show the confusion of philosophers over the basic meaning of this term. Each philosopher assumes that his use is clear and understood, whereas the authors show this is far from the case; they distinguish sixteen different meanings of meaning . . . (p13)

In the usual experience, the semiological triangle, there is always a percept, a concept and a representation. This is irreducible. In architecture, one sees the building, has an interpretation of it, and usually puts that into words . . . In most cases there is no direct relation between a word and a thing, except in the highly specific case of onomatopoeia. That most cultures are under the illusion that there is a direct connection has to be explained in various ways. One explanation is neoplatonic; another is psychological. In any case, everyone has experienced the shock of eating a thing which is called by the wrong name, or would question the adage that a rose 'by any other name would smell as sweet'. It would not smell as sweet if called garlic.

But the main point of the semiological triangle is that there are simply relations between language, thought and reality. One area does not determine the other, except in rare cases, and all one can really claim with conviction is that there are simply connections, or correlations . . . (pp15-16)

Context and Metaphor

There are two primary ways to cut through the environment of all sign behaviour. For instance fashion, language, food and architecture all convey meaning in two similar ways: either through opposition or association. This basic division receives a new terminology from each semiologist, because their purposes differ: here they will be called context and metaphor.

It is evident, as a result of such things as Morse Code and the computer, that a sign may gain meaning just from its oppositions or contrast to another. In the simple case of the computer, or code, it may be the oppositions between 'off-on' or 'dot-dash'; in the more complex case of the traffic light each sign gains its meaning by opposition to the other two. In a natural language each word gains its sense by contrast with all the others and thus it is capable of much subtler shades of meaning than the traffic light. Still one could build up a respectable discourse

with only two relations, as critics have found. The perennial question of whether a good, bad symphony is better or worse than a bad, good symphony is not as it appears an idle pastime – simply because one adjective acts as the classifier while the other acts as the modifier and vice versa . . . (p21)

The other dimension of meaning is conveyed through associations, metaphors or the whole treasure of past memory. This is often built up socially, when a series of words conveys the same connotations in a language. But it also occurs individually through some experience of relating one sign to another: either because of a common quality, or because they both occurred in the same context (which would be the common quality, *pace* behaviourists). Thus an individual might associate blue with the sound of a trumpet either because he heard a trumpet playing the blues in an all blue context (the expressionist ideal), or because they both have a common synaesthetic centre; they both cluster around further metaphors of harshness, sadness and depth. The behaviourist Charles Osgood (*Measurement of Meaning*) has thus postulated a 'semantic space' for every individual which is made up by the way metaphors relate one to another . . . (p22)

Multivalence and Univalence

When one sees an architecture which has been created with equal concern for form, function and technic, this ambiguity creates a multivalent experience where one oscillates from meaning to meaning always finding further justification and depth. One cannot separate the method from the purpose because they have grown together and become linked through the process of continual feedback. And these multivalent links set up an analogous condition where one part modifies another in a continuous series of cyclical references. As Coleridge and IA Richards have shown in the analysis of a few lines from Shakespeare, this imaginative fusion can be tested by showing the mutual modification of links. But the same should be done for any sign system from *Hamlet* to French pastry. In every case, if the object has been created through an imaginative linkage of matrices (or bisociation in Koestler's terms), then it will be experienced as a multivalent whole. If, on the other hand, the object is the summation of past forms which remain independent, and where they are joined the linkage is weak, then it is experienced as univalent. This distinction between multivalence and univalence, or imagination and fancy, is one of the oldest in criticism and probably enters any critic's language in synonymous terms . . . (p24)

To concentrate first on the univalence of the *Semantic Space* [see diagram overleaf], one can see how architects tend to cluster around similar areas, which to my mind constitute groups or traditions. Secondly, my preference for the